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1. Introduction 
1.1. General 
The geopolitical situation around the Baltic Sea is currently changing more than during the last two 
centuries combined, as concerns both economics and security. The European Union has lately expanded 
towards  Sweden and Finland,  thereby attaching the  Baltic  Sea  to  the  common EU sphere  of  interest.  
Denmark, and especially Germany, have strongly promoted the northern expansion of the EU: Denmark 
sees the increase of Nordic states within the Union as an increase in the number of like- minded partners, 
whereas Germany enhances its geopolitically central role through the membership of the two Nordic 
nations. Thus, the importance of the Baltic Sea and the increase in this importance as a consequence of 
the memberships are bound to have been in the calculations of the Danish and German policy makers 
when advocating the admission of these nations. 
In Russia, the still continuing change of the system has raised questions about the future commitments of 
this former - and current - superpower within the Baltic region. Parallel to this alteration, new, 
independent states have emerged in the Baltic sphere: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These nations, in 
turn, remain question marks as to their future preferences within the global family. Apparently, in order 
to strengthen their fragile independence, the Baltic States will favour commitments with the traditional 
western structures. Poland, a rapidly improving economy, stresses its relations with the EU and 
Germany, and presumably later its full membership in NATO. The Baltic Sea, however, functions as the 
only sea route for its considerable merchant fleet. 
Due to the above alterations and considerations in these nations surrounding the Baltic Sea, pondering 
the general future security of the region seems a logical and even inevitable consequence of the change 
Security matters will be put on the official agenda, in order to chart and cement such status quo within 
the Baltic Sea that shelters 
 2
and enhances the optimal form, quantity and continuity of trade and other relations in the region. This 
essay will indicate that independent of the form of the future security arrangements within the Baltic Sea, 
this area will become a core focus concerning European security in the coming years. The well-being and 
harmony there may to a large extent contribute to total Euroatlantic security. Conversely, false politics 
and short-sighted actions around the Baltic Sea may cause severe damage to world order. 
The essay consists of five sections. In this section, the geographic scope of the research will be defined, 
as well as the key international institutions that are of relevance in the future of the region. In the second 
part, a dense summary of the historical background of the Baltic Sea area will be provided, concerning 
such developments and situations that are adequate when discussing the present and the future of this 
region. Third, the present situation section will give a broader view of the recent past, since the 1989 
regime change in Russia until the membership of Finland and Sweden in the EU. The fourth section 
contains three simplified models of the future of the Baltic Sea, the substance, implications and 
consequences of which the author clarifies. The conclusions support the hypothesis: Whichever of the 
three scenarios materialises, the future importance of the Baltic Sea will increase as regards economy 
and thereby security. Nevertheless, the fulfilment of one scenario is less painful than the others in the 
future security pursuits in the area. Hence, a recommendation will be made of the optimal, if not ideal 
manner of reaching a satisfactory security status quo as the framework for functioning trade and other 
relations in the Baltic context. 
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I 
1.2. Defining the Actors to Be Referred 
1.2.1. The Nations in the Baltic Sea Region 
The definition of this area may be construed on any of several grounds. The author has chosen to include 
nations that either are physically adjacent to the Sea, or nations that otherwise have a close contact to the 
Sea and/or to several nations adjacent to it. 
The Baltic Sea itself, since January 1, 1995 partially an internal EU sea, is located in north-eastern 
Europe, surrounded in the south by the European continent (including Poland), the heartland, in the west 
by the Danish peninsula, in the north-west by the Scandinavian peninsula, in the north and north-east by 
Finland, and in the east by Russia and the Baltic states. The Sea serves active maritime traffic, and before 
the improvement of internationally satisfactory land routes in the Baltic states as well as the 
bridge/tunnel connection between Sweden and Denmark, the Sea will function as the major trade route 
between the European continent and Fennoscandia, as well as the St. Petersburg area and the Baltic 
states. 
To the nations directly adjacent to it belong clockwise, starting from the south-west, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Norway does not possess coast facing 
the Baltic Sea, but due to its close contact to navigation from the Baltic Sea region (at the easternmost 
part of the North Sea), and a traditional commitment to Nordic co-operation with Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark, Norway will be included in the Baltic Sea context. 
1.2.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO 
NATO was created in 1949 to "...safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and 
military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations."1 This transatlantic 
collective-defence organisation states in its key  
1 NATO handbook (NATO Office of Information and Press/Brussels 1992), p. 11 
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provision that, "...an armed attack against one or more of them [the parties to the treaty] in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all."1 
In the Baltic Sea context, Denmark, Germany and Norway are currently members of this collective- 
defence organisation, whereas Russia, the Baltic states and Poland are involved in the North Atlantic 
Co-operation Council NACC, concentrating on "...consultations and co-operation..."2 between NATO 
and nations in Eastern and Central Europe that, for one reason or another, cannot yet be attached to the 
core collective-defence Finland and Sweden, in turn, no longer maintain a high profile neutrality, and 
thus, there are no direct obstacles to them joining NATO. At the moment, however, the EU arrangements 
are preferred to NATO ones in the respective countries. Nevertheless, all the Baltic Sea area states are 
involved in either NATO, NACC or the Partnership for Peace, the latter being a co-operative and 
discussing rather than practical institution for further concerns in the transatlantic security prospects. 
1.2.3. European Union (EU) 
As a consequence of the Baltic Sea becoming an internal European Union sea, a demand has emerged for 
charting and arranging the security of this area as an internal EU security matter. The first pillar of the 
Maastricht Treaty 1992, Common Foreign and Security Policy, provides the Union a future vision of 
co-operation and even centralisation of decision-making within this area in the Commission. Today, 
however, major concentration is on economics and expansion. No earlier than in the scheduled 
intergovernmental conference in 1996 shall foreign and security prospects of the Union 
                                            
2 Bennett A. International Organisations - Principles And Issues (Prentice Hall/ Eaglewood Cliffs NJ 
1995), p. 250 
3 NATO handbook, p. 17 
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be scrutinised. Hence, this reference will not become essential before 1996 as concerns the security of 
the Baltic Sea. At that time, the idea of a dense, all-covering Western European Union will be 
reconsidered 
1.2.3.1. Western European Union (WEU) 
The idea of an all-encompassing security arrangement in Western Europe is by no means new: already 
the Treaty of Rome addressed the need for this kind of arrangement for cementing the European status 
quo. That time, however, the threat from the Warsaw Pact cluster constituted the main reason for such 
thoughts.  NATO  was  considered  as  a  sufficient  means  for  meeting  this  threat.  In  the  coming  1996  
intergovernmental conference, however, the focus will be set on preventing nationality conflicts between 
and within the member countries, instead of defining a common adversary, not from east nor from the 
south, although the fundamentalist tendencies south of the Mediterranean will be taken into 
consideration. In the Baltic Sea region, given the facts that the Economic Union membership is bound to 
be  a  condition  for  the  WEU  membership,  and  that  Russia,  the  Baltic  states  and  Poland  are  far  from  
fulfilling the economic criteria of joining the EU, the WEU arrangements are not likely to become an 
all-compassing Pan-Baltic solution for at least the near future security of this region. 
1.2.4. The Conference (Organisation) for Security and Co-operation in Europe CSCE                                            
In contrast to the legally binding WEU and NATO, the co-operative and consensus- based CSCE, 
initiated in Helsinki in 1975, "... strives for...non-intervention and peaceful inter-European relations 
internationally. It links national and international factors in order to promote a versatile and stable state 
of peace as well as favourable circumstances for trade and security in Europe."4 Of the states of the Baltic 
Sea area, all those that existed at that time signed the Helsinki Final Act 1975. At that time, the 
4  Tanner. A. "CSCE And Human Rights - Legally Normative But Morally Binding ?" (Brussels 1994). p 1 
Soviet Union was the predecessor of current Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to current 
international customary law, in case of state succession, the successor state may or may not accept a 
pre-existing treaty. 5 In the case of the Baltic states, it is at least implied that they have accepted their 
commitment to the CSCE, since in the case of the recent disputes between the large Russian minorities 
and the natives, a CSCE delegation was sent to Estonia. Thus, independent of whether formalities after 
the succession have been performed, at least the customs - as indicated through the sending of the 
delegation - shows that also the Baltic states are a part of the system. 
Hence, as all the Baltic Sea region countries are a part of the CSCE, and in order to define its significance 
in the reality security context, let us shortly ponder the pertinent underlying ideas within the CSCE. It has 
to be kept in mind that the baskets and the principles have only an indirect binding effect: they are to be 
comprehended as normative, as results of co-operation. In the Helsinki Final Act 1975, mentioned 
formerly, the sixth principle of the first, security and military matter basket deals with non-intervention, 
the core prerequisite for security. This is also one of the most important definitions within the CSCE 
process. The non-intervention principle enforces the refraining from any kind of intervention against "… 
domestic jurisdiction of another state, regardless of their mutual relations." 6 Without the fulfilment of 
this prerequisite, all security efforts in the Baltic Sea are doomed to fail. Unfortunately, the obedience to 
this principle is by no means self-evident, will be later indicated. 
All in all, despite its non-binding status, the CSCE is currently the only functioning regional, 
Pan-European institution in the field of security that covers all the Baltic Sea area nations. Nonetheless, 
as formerly indicated, its function is dependent and based on the moral standards and also consensus of 
the member states. As the Budapest 
 
  5 Weston. B.H. et al. International Law and World Order (West Publishing co./ St. Paul 1990). p. 431 
6  Weston. B.H. et al Basic Documents in International Law (West Publishing co./ St Paul 1990). p. 116 
conference in December 1994 indicated, in case of relating to the Bosnian and Chechnyan crises, the 
moral is sometimes lacking - and the consensus often. No common statement concerning the crises could 
be achieved, let alone a synchronised plan for action, this partly due to Russian subjectivity in the issue, 
partly due to the double standards of the Western European nations. 
1.2.5. Other Factors of Relevance 
In addition to NATO, EU, WEU and CSCE that are focusing the region from a purely European or a 
transatlantic (NATO) point of view, global institutions are also involved in European, as well as Baltic 
security. Western Europe constitutes a geopolitical unit of more than 350 million inhabitants, whereas 
the Baltic Sea region, taking into account only the Saint Petersburg area in Russia and the northernmost 
parts of Germany and Poland, counts up to roughly 55 million people. No doubt also the UN is aware of 
the alteration continuing in this large, northern fragment of Europe. 
Despite the current internal dilemmas concerning the sticky decision-making as well as the nebulous 
extension of the peace-keeping mandate, and the substance of it in the UN, the United Nations still plays 
a considerable role securing peace, also in northern Europe Boutros Boutros-Ghali indicated in the An 
Agenda for Peace7 in  1992  the  determined  willingness  of  the  UN  to  stay  alert  in  a  cumulatively  
aggressive world environment. The role of the UN in the Baltic region would become relevant if neither 
an extended NATO nor an active WEU would be established, and the CSCE could not handle a particular 
conflict within its auspices, i.e. in a consultative and co-operative manner. If either of the participants in 
such security dispute in the Baltic region was Russia, one could, on the other hand, speculate the 
involvement of NATO if its interests were at least indirectly threatened. 
7 Boutros-Ghali. B. An Agenda for Peace; Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-keeping. document 
S/24111, United Nations, New York. 1992 
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2. The Backgrounds And History of the Security of the Baltic Sea 2.1. 
Ancient 
Since the Viking era, the Baltic area has been considered as an entity, hence causing numerous contacts 
between the regions of the Sea. Navigation on the Sea, not only "military" but also trade, became even 
more lively in the Middle Ages, when the Hansas from the north German coastal towns of Lubeck, 
Hamburg and Kiel started shipping "luxury" goods of that time, such as grain, salt or textiles to the north. 
In the northern ports of Aboa (Finnish Turku) or Reval (Estonian Tallinn), the locals could offer tar and 
wood in exchange. 
Not only was economic activity lively in the Middle Ages, but also cultural and especially religious 
activity existed. Protestant Christianity, originated by Martin Luther in Germany, was more or less 
"shipped" via Sweden eastwards and northwards, as were Estonian, Finnish or Swedish scholars of 
various fields to the universities of Bologna or Heidelberg. The Russians, proud of their century-long 
Byzantine heritage, could resist the Protestant landing from the Baltic Sea. Economically, nonetheless, 
the Baltic Sea functioned as the only suitable route of Russian goods to continental markets. Thus, also 
the significant Russian "merchant fleet" utilised this route for transporting furs, minerals and rare wood 
types to Europe. 
Due to this centuries-long naval activity, the current genealogical and racial heritage of the Finns, for 
example, now consists of roughly 30 per cent Nordic/Germanic genes, 30 per cent Baltic, and 30 per cent 
eastern. In northern Germany, in turn, the scientists have discovered an inherited heart disease-causing 
gene that only exists elsewhere in south-western Finland. 8 
 
 
8  This information was provided by Aira Kemiläinen, a Finnish anthropologist, in the Finnish TV1 in December  
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2.2. The World Wars 
The time period between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century was marked by the power struggle 
between Sweden and Russia for the mastery of the northern regions. Often, the Baltic Sea served as the 
battlefield for crucial naval conflicts, leading to total slaughters, and thus even to a temporary 
disappearance of the loser from the map of that time. Rule over the Baltic Sea meant a rule over a much 
larger area than merely that limited to the coasts of the Sea. 
The First World War was characterised by the independence aspirations of Finland and the Baltic states 
from Russian oppression. The causes and conditions for war in central Europe played only a marginal 
role in the power struggles of the Baltic Sea. Not Russia nor Sweden, not even the bloody civil war in 
Finland could hinder the fragmentation of the north-eastern Baltic Sea region to small independent 
states: Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania emerged as states, not only nations any longer, in the 
aftermath of the First World War. 
The eve of the Second World War was also in the Baltic sphere coloured by the division into Nazi or 
anti-Nazi blocs, as well as to Communist-favouring and Communist-resisting groupings. The south and 
the south-west of the Baltic Sea. however, were initially attached to the German sphere of interest, 
independent of the division indicated above. Poland, Denmark and Norway could not resist the mental 
and physical superiority of Hitler totalitarianism. Finland and the Baltic states, however, were in the 
Ribbentrop pact transferred to Soviet authority control. In Stalin's and Hitler's common aspirations, these 
nations would function as a buffer zone between the two future superpowers, the Third Reich and the 
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. In this phase, Sweden wisely presented a low profile, not 
committing itself to the dilemmas of its neighbours, Norway and Finland. 
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As Hitler's pursuits failed, and the weak Baltic states were not able to resist the Soviet Union, these were 
easily transferred to the Soviet hegemony. Finland, in turn, after a miserable episode on the German side 
- this due to the practical insignificance of the Ribbentrop pact - finished the war without any power 
occupying its territory. However, it would be daring to argue that the Finns won something in the war. 
Quite the contrary: The Soviet Union, one of the winning powers, dictated strict conditions for Finland 
to finance massive war reparations. 
Poland, fortunate enough to survive somewhat after the German aggression, became so paralysed that 
one can reasonably discuss whether Poland had ever been attached to the Soviet sphere of interest 
without the slackening effect of the Second World War. In contrast to Poland, that at least marginally 
survived, Germany became more or less of a tabula rasa, an empty blackboard, rendering vulnerable the 
mere existence of the German nation. The nations under German control, Denmark and Norway, could 
naturally encounter a relief, as the suppression ended parallel to the destruction of the Nazi structures. 
Sweden, too, was relieved, though it was not physically directly threatened by the war. Indirect risks and 
limitations in politics and trade, however, declined, and Sweden could, again, open up and flourish. 
2.3. The Cold War 
The Second World War meant a considerable change in the Baltic Sea region, and that not only 
militarily but also economically and socioculturally. The war produced a power vacuum to the south of 
the Baltic Sea, which was recognised among the leaders of the other superpowers. Given additionally the 
fact that the main objective of the winning powers was to keep Germany down and under, talented 
statesmen and strategists, especially in the USSR, saw the importance of the Baltic Sea. 
The worsening of the superpower relations in the 1950's was largely a consequence of the expansion of 
the Soviet Union in its near abroad. After Russia's tormenting of the 
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Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), and succeeding in it, Poland followed on the Russian 
agenda. And as the Berlin situation became acute, resulting in a new Soviet-related puppet, the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), the Soviet Union had ensured that the Baltic coast line, from near Saint 
Petersburg all the way to near the significant West German ports of Kiel and Lübeck, was either under 
her own control, or under the control of a friendly puppet state. 
The Baltic Sea had become another arena for the Cold War. As Norway and Denmark decided to seek 
membership in NATO, in order to increase the credibility of their own, minor armed forces, Sweden 
decided consequently to follow its policy of staying out of the interest conflicts of the superpowers: it 
declared that it would follow the principle of neutrality. In the case of Finland, the consequence was the 
same, though the reason different, remaining neutral was not entirely a question of Finland's free will. 
Rather, Finland took its geopolitical position into consideration. In order for a small nation to remain 
independent adjacent to an unpredictable superpower and a militarily critical Sea, it had to take the 
objectives of this superpower into account. This was called neutrality by the Finns. Some cynics later 
called the rationality of this kind as Finlandisation, or Finlandisierung. 
In sum. the Baltic Sea was between the end of the 1940's and the end of 1980's clearly divided into three 
parts, the pro-NATO, the pro-Soviet (the regimes, not necessarily the public) and the neutrals. For the 
USSR, this Sea was critical: its Western Navy, based in Kronstadt, near Saint Petersburg, constituted the 
largest proportion of total Soviet naval strength. The sea route for the Soviet military vessels to the 
Atlantic, however, was either closed or open in the Danish Sound, depending on the contemporary 
superpower politics. In times of détente, or the peaceful coexistence under Khrushchev, the Russian 
military vessels could count on sailing through, but presumably not when the Cold War became freezing, 
such as during Brezhnev, Chernenko or Andropov. Despite certain submarine-spying suspicions of the 
Swedish 
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Defence Department against the Russian Navy in late 80 s, the transfer of Michael Gorbachev to power, 
and his Glasnost, openness, relieved the tensions somewhat, although the Soviet Union could not still be 
considered as democratic. Not until Boris Yeltsin came to power did the worst taboos disappear from 
around the Baltic Sea. 
Considering the Baltic history as a whole, one can recognise the length, width and depth of the relations 
among the Baltic Sea states. This dimension increases the significance of the restructuring of the Baltic 
Sea region security: The question here is not of creating another geopolitically motivated cluster on some 
artificial grounds for some vague purpose. Here, the future security arrangements will not only reflect the 
current, short-term objectives of each state, but they will imply the learning of the lessons from the past, 
in order to create a long-lasting state of harmony that facilitates beneficial contacts among the Baltic Sea 
states. 
3. The Present Situation in the Region 
Now that the present security arrangements and the history of the Baltic sphere have been discussed, the 
author  will  study some intrinsic  current  factors  in  the  states  themselves,  that  are  of  importance  when 
sewing together the diverse security needs of the states around the Baltic Sea, in the form of a possible 
common security arrangement or at least more dense co-operation. The domestic situations and foreign 
policy objectives do vary widely not only between the states but also within the states. This section 
discusses the vast quantity and mutual complexity of domestic and foreign factors that should be 
interconnected and synchronised if a common security arrangement were aspired to. The task is 
problematic, though not impossible, as soon as the rational leaders of the respective Baltic Sea nations 
recognise which essential role the harmony in the near region plays in the domestic successes of these 
nations. 
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3.1. The Unstable Russia 
Fundamentally, the political struggle within Russia is over whether 
Russia will be a national and increasingly European state or a 
distinctively Eurasian and once again an imperial state.9 
Currently, the Russian political map is divided to three, First, roughly a third of the politicians and 
executives are pro-Western. Second, again roughly a third are "Eurasian", i.e. that prefer a superpower 
distinctively out of the European context. The third group includes the rest that either can or want not to 
make up their minds, or prefer a compromise, "the berries from both cakes", such as an economically 
Western but politically Eurasian Russia 
3.1.1. The Current Importance of the Baltic Sea for Russia 
For the European-oriented Russians such as Andrei Kozyrev, the current Foreign Minister, or Sergei 
Kovalev, President Yeltsin's human rights commissioner, the Baltic Sea is bound to serve as the window 
to Europe, economically, politically and, especially, in security. As, however, formerly noticed, there is 
no one official opinion in Russia towards Europe, and the Baltic Sea. The Eurasianists, most Communists 
and Nationalists, are willing to establish a new superpower Russia, and hence, the Baltic Sea is unlikely 
to be seen as the nest for harmonious and beneficial trade and political relations Rather, this area is seen 
as a strategically important sea, and a feasible site for conflict. 
Specifically, the current Russian relation towards the since 1991 independent Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania has been under discussion, due to probable human rights disputes of the Baltic officials against 
Russian minorities on the one hand, and due to the restrictive attitude of the Russians towards Baltic 
involvement in international organisations on the other hand, 
9 Brzezinski. Z. "A Plan For Europe" Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 1995), p. 31 
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The relationship between Russia and the Baltic states is one of those 
areas where Western policy may in fact make a substantial difference, 
particularly by ensuring that Russia accepts that it must fully conform 
to international norms of behaviour.10 
3.1.2. European And Global Security Arrangements as Reflected upon the Russian Attitude towards 
the Baltic Sea 
 
The Soviet Union was the power to actively promote the CSCE process prior and at 
the time of the CSCE Helsinki summit 1975. Thereafter, too, the USSR and its partial 
successor, Russia, have favoured consultations within this co-operative, pan-European 
security instrument. Today, as concerns Russia's status towards NATO - as formerly 
stated - it is a part of both the NACC and the Partnership for Peace. But what 
importance does the NATO connection have to the future security of the Baltic Sea"7 
According to contemporary scholars, Russian membership in NATO does not explicitly mean a 
more beneficial North-European security environment, and should not thus necessarily be taken as 
an end in itself, 
..Russia's participation would so dilute [NATO] as to render 
it meaningless...It is not even clear whether the Russians 
wish to be part of NATO. But if excluded and rejected, they 
will be resentful, and their own political self-definition will 
become more anti-European and anti-Western [and 
anti-Baltic].11 
 
Moreover, the time frame of extending NATO towards the north-east is rather seen in 
decades than years. In this vision, it is already presupposed that some of the Baltic Sea 
nations bordering with Russia- Norway naturally excluded- would be members of 
NATO, 
The question of Russia's participation will have to be faced only when a 
wider NATO has actually reached the frontiers 
10 Bildt. C. "The Baltic Litmus Test" Foreign Affairs (Sep./Oct. 1994), p. 84 
11 Brzezinski. p. 31 
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of Russia - and only if by then Russia satisfies the basic criteria 
for membership. Neither is likely soon.12 
Nor is likely the WEU membership as addressed formerly. Thus, the Russian contacts 
within the Baltic Sea region in the near future will presumably be organised either 
through mutual, bilateral arrangements, through an extended CSCE (OSCE) mandate 
or through "toy versions" of NATO or the WEU. These alternatives will be discussed 
in the fourth section. 
3.2. The Recently Independent Baltic States And Poland 
 
Perhaps the largest change between 1989 and 1995 has occurred in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: 
They have regained their independence from Slavic rule, their economic system has changed from 
planned to market economy, and most significantly, they have gone through a most painful 
metamorphosis from totalitarianism to democracy. These nations are small, altogether roughly 8 
million people, but important as indicators of the Russian treatment of its "near abroad." "...Russian 
conduct towards these states will show the true nature of Russia's commitment to international 
norms and principles."13 
Poland, in turn, with its circa 25 million business-oriented inhabitants and ingeniously exploding 
economy has been seen as a mere market appendix to Germany. However, this, northern Europe's 
biggest totally Catholic nation, and one of the largest Slavic nations possesses hidden potential that, 
if used properly, may mean a further kick for the Baltic Sea commerce. The possible future 
improvement of the currently controversial relation between President Lech Walesa and the 
Parliament plays a key role in the evident future success. As far as foreign policy is concerned, 
Poland is searching for a rapid membership in both the EU and NATO, It may become the first EU 
and NATO borderland with the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
12 Brzezinski. 
p.31                               
13 Bildt. p. 72 
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3.3. The Old EU and NATO members Germany and Denmark 
These nations have recently promoted Baltic co-operation most, partly due to causes expressed in 
the introduction, partly due to security reasons. As the Baltic states are now independent and at least 
neutral if not very pro-Western, and Finland and Sweden non-divisive parts of the European Union, 
German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe may now bury the horror picture of the Russian Western 
Navy conquering the northern ports of Germany, Kiel and Travemunde, in 48 hours. 
In addition to the mere selfish geopolitical and military reasons, Baltic Sea cooperation itself 
fascinates Germany and Denmark. Common matters may then be pondered in one table, as has 
already happened recently, concerning the environmental issues around the Baltic Sea. And the 
increase in maritime trade acts as a stimulation that, sooner or later, brings prosperity also to the 
south-eastern and eastern coasts of the sea 
3.4. Finland and Sweden: New Nordic States Within the EU 
Of the Nordic counterparts within the Baltic Sea system, Finland and Sweden have approached their 
south-western neighbours Germany and Denmark through becoming members in the European 
Union. For Finland, for the time being recovering from the quantitatively worst depression ever in 
its history, the formerly essential Baltic Sea has now become critical. Humble Soviet markets no 
more exist, nor do the Finns have a monopoly in the rock-hard Russian markets. Due to the new 
situations,  an  essential  proportion  of  the  Finnish  trade  is  conducted  across  the  Baltic  Sea,  with  
Sweden, Germany and Great Britain. 
In the case of Sweden, also endeavouring to recover from an ugly regression, the Baltic Sea remains 
being of high significance, though not primarily economically: Even though Sweden's trade with 
Russia and the Baltic States is increasing, most activity occurs towards the continent over the 
narrow Danish Sound Hence, not much of the 
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Swedish merchant fleet utilises the Baltic Sea. Sweden's interests are in the security of the Baltic Sea 
itself. During the Cold War, especially during Olof Palme's political activity, it was particularly Sweden 
that functioned as the conscience of the Baltic Sea. Often, huge assets were invested in chasing foreign 
submarines along the Swedish east coast. No doubt these vessels were considered to be Soviet. Once, in 
the late 1980's as the Swedes succeeded in catching a Soviet submarine, heavy notes were directed 
towards the Kremlin, concerning a violation of the CSCE principle of non-intervention: the submarine 
spying  was  considered  as  such.  If  the  Swedish  aspiration  towards  high  morals  still  exists,  then  a  
beneficial future security around the Baltic Sea will provide the framework for Sweden to consistently 
carry on with its morally appreciable policies 
3.5. Norway: Within the NATO but outside the EU 
The security position of Norway cannot be compared to the one of its eastern neighbour Sweden; 
Norway already possesses a heavy security insurance policy through membership in NATO The current 
regime (still successfully lead by the Social Democrat Gro Harlem Brundtland despite the loss of her 
pro-EU front in the October -94 voting) sees the importance of the Baltic Sea. If a conflict was to occur 
around the Baltic Sea, whichever were the threatener and the threatened, it would have a direct effect on 
Norway's security. It can be seen on the map that Norway is an extremely long but also narrow country 
geopolitically. If, say, an imperialist Russia could stroll over a weakly organised Baltic Sea area, over 
Finland and Sweden towards the Atlantic, the ingredients of a global conflict would already be there. 
NATO, in order to shelter the strategically extraordinarily essential North Atlantic area, would 
concentrate a large number of troops on the Norwegian coast. Thereafter, it would only be a question of 
time when a full-scale war broke out. Due to this purely military factor, Norway is eager to keep the 
tension around the Baltic Sea minimised, and she will also be interested in contributing to such 
arrangements under the auspices of which these tensions may be managed. It has to be stressed that 
Norway will negotiate not only 
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under the authority of NATO but also independently. Norway is capable of this kind of action, as seen in 
the Middle East peace process: It was a Norwegian patron that originated and hosted the beginning of the 
seemingly successful peace talks between Arafat and Rabin during 1992. 
4. Future Scenarios Concerning the Security of the Baltic Sea Region 
Taking the basically different political situations and objectives of the respective Baltic Sea nations into 
consideration, predicting the future of this region seems highly complicated Nonetheless, co-operation 
will be preferred, if it seems, in the considerations of the decision-makers, that this co-operation is 
parallel to the national interests of these nations. As formerly discussed, the national interests of the 
Baltic Sea environment are by no means limited only to distinctively military or distinctively economic 
interests. Rather, the two areas of interest are closely interconnected with social, cultural and other 
factors. 
Despite the diverse interests around the Baltic Sea, it is nonetheless surrounded by quite developed 
nations, and therefore it differs from other focal points of future international relations, such as the 
Israel-Jordan-Syria-Lebanon-Egypt region or the area between the Caspian and Black Seas. The 
difference gives more predictability. Around the Baltic Sea, the high education level, a similar religion 
(diverse forms of Christianity), several common commitments to global or European institutions, 
independence of the mass media and even the relatively non-fanatic characteristic of current northern 
culture allow the scholar of international relations to make anticipations. The probability of these 
anticipations materialising is higher here than similar predictions would be in the Middle East or in 
Chechnya. The latter and many other areas in international focus lack even relative stability, economic 
but especially religious and sociocultural, whereas the Baltic Sea region, fortunately enough, lacks 
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the possibility of complete foreign political surprises due to positively stiff formalities in proceeding 
with diverse matters and issues. 
The author is encouraged to state the preceding notwithstanding the situation in Russia: Despite the 
current rigorous domestic power struggle, Russia desperately endeavours to maintain a "boy scout" 
image towards the outer world. For example, the Chechnyan war was according to President Yeltsin 
caused by the turmoil within the army, not within the policies of the nation.14 Without formally 
predictable relations and procedures towards the outer world, and with a subsequent isolation, a fatal 
turmoil would emerge in Russia. The Russian realist top politicians know this, and thus, the author can 
count on a Russia that carefully protects its outside commitments, even if it started growing remote from 
Europe towards Eurasia. The foreign relations are critical to the existence of Russia. 
Consequently, as the mutual actions of these states are likely to follow some expected patterns, 
simplified models of the future of the Baltic Sea may be construed. Four variables will be taken into 
consideration interactively: the feasibly deepening and extending character of the WEU after the 1996 
EU intergovernmental conference; the possible decrease or eastward extension of the scope of NATO, 
the future compatibility or aggressiveness of Russia towards Europe, and finally, the role of the OSCE 
(CSCE) in case of the passivity or withdrawal of the other relevant institutions from the Baltic context 
4.1. Scenario 1: Stabilising Russia Increases Co-operation With the EU, 
WEU Emerges in Full Scale, NATO's Importance in Europe 
Diminishes 
The basic preconditions for a future of this kind would demand, at a minimum, two things: First,  the 
opinion of an extended and even denser European Union should win support within the Community 
before the 1996 intergovernmental conference. This 
14 Boris Yeltsin's speech in the Russian Parliament on February 16. 1995. 
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would require that a) the supporters of the two-speed Europe (Benelux, France, Germany) should 
withdraw from this idea, and that b) the "bad guys" Great Britain and Denmark should be persuaded to 
follow common ideals. Without an economics-related improvement of this kind it would also be hard if 
not impossible to reach a consensus in security matters. The fulfilment of these two prerequisites, 
hopefully together, would then promote the equal and collective nature of the Union. Under these 
circumstances, the 1996 conference would be able to decide upon the "activation" of the WEU in a large 
scale, i.e. extending it also towards the Baltic Sea. 
The second prerequisite, critical to the fulfilment of this scenario in general, and to the activation of the 
WEU in particular, would be the diminishing involvement of the United States in Europe. The reduction 
of US involvement would then call into question the significance of NATO as a transatlantic security 
arrangement. Why would the United States become less committed to European matters? Either due to 
the transfer of interest to domestic or, say, Pacific matters or due to a diminishing US power in the area. 
Apparently, the reduction in US influence would at least be a consequence of the fulfilment of this 
scenario, but it could also act as a cause of it. If, for example, the present US government failed in or 
ignored its Europe policies, and stressed domestic policies or Asian relations, it could be interpreted as a 
slackening US authority in Europe. This would obviously also question the importance of NATO and 
increase the visibility of the advantages of the WEU. 
Consensus within the EU and the diminishing US commitments to Europe could make the ground fertile 
for an arrangement such as the WEU. This improvement would be noticed not only within the EU but 
also without. We could hypothesise that in Russia, at least those still in doubt and suspicious of the 
United States could now be persuaded to start favouring the alternative of Russia as a distinctively 
European, instead of Eurasian, superpower. This could, then, even facilitate the stabilisation in Russia if 
the 
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pro-Europeans could convince the pro-Eurasians of the sincere and true purposes of the future Europe. 
President Yeltsin indicated in his speech 16 February 1995, that the extension of NATO eastbound will 
not come into question, although he expressed this argument simultaneously with the promise of not 
threatening the fragile, new democracies in central and eastern Europe. Hence, as Yeltsin and some of 
his closest supporters, such as Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister, seem to remain Western-oriented 
(Yeltsin more hidden, Kozyrev openly), added to the fact that the extension of NATO is excluded, it is 
bound to be implied that Yeltsin and his men are not fiercely antagonistic toward the WEU. Yeltsin's 
worries concerning the more or less uncontrollable state of the army, as indicated in the recent speech, 
seem to disclose his (desperate9) intentions of changing the status quo within the Russian military. If 
Yeltsin stays in power, if the WEU is interested - which it is bound to be - in close relations to Russia and 
if the extension of the WEU materialises, then this WEU- Russia axis could bring about a fixed round 
table of large importance for the peace and harmony in Europe. None of the three ifs, however, is explicit 
to materialise, though none is quite impossible either. 
Putting these global and European tendencies in a Baltic Sea perspective brings up certain implications. 
It seems that if a future of this kind emerged, then the Baltic Sea would be well off. The closer the 
co-operation between Russia and Europe, the more harmonious and thereby safer and more effective the 
trade and other relations within the area would be. The issues raised would be merely technical within 
the auspices of this co-operation 
Nevertheless, certain problematic matters could arise: The possible minor role of a still existing NATO, 
the mutual "hierarchy" in this kind of WEU-Russia-axis, as well as the consequently changing 
US-European relations. The basis of the author's hypothesis 
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was the decrease of the influence and even a total ceasing-to-exist of NATO and the increase in the 
importance of the WEU. However, there might be reluctance towards the real military capability of the 
WEU. Of the Baltic Sea states certainly Germany, due to much of its defence traditionally leaning on US 
NATO troops, as well as Norway, due to its geopolitical sensitivity, could still persist in eliciting some 
guarantee from a structure similar to NATO, dependent obviously on the interests of the US. All in all, 
there could be some reluctant partners in this WEU-Russia axis, quite as there are reluctant partners in 
any alliance or body. 
Another problem could arise within the axis, namely considering the problem of hierarchy. Around the 
Baltic Sea, Russia is the giant with more than 150 million inhabitants, whereas Germany with its 80 
million and Poland with its 25 million follow. The rest of the nations are small. In order this sort of an 
"axis" to make some sense, the large powers should have "a louder vote" on the one hand, but the small 
should also have their voice heard, on the other hand, and certainly more than their population 
proportion would indicate. Compromising here and succeeding in it could play a critical role in the 
future commitments of an axis of this kind. Sceptics might call this impossible, but due to the importance 
of this area to Russia, as well as having Germany as a balancer, an axis of this kind may be very possible. 
The US, in turn, could without NATO become worried about the close relations of Western Europe and 
Russia.  How  long  would  Western  Europe  then  be  considered  as  "loyal"  to  the  US9 If the feeling of 
European loyalty vanished from the mindsets of the US decision-makers, not would only Russia but also 
some or all parts of Europe become a threat in the US foreign-policy setting. This kind of development 
would obviously be intolerable for the whole world, especially for Europe - let alone the Baltic Sea that 
should again become a central playground for rigorous psychological - and even military - warfare. This 
remains only a horror picture, but calls for caution: 
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walk slowly and carry a big stick. In this case, the author would either prefer hiding the stick for a while 
or finding a carrot. 
In sum, the Baltic Sea area would as a whole benefit from the establishment of an extended WEU, 
covering much of the Baltic Sea. A necessary condition for the success in the region would then be the 
stabilising of Russia, for the moment not yet certain. If the WEU were extended all the way up to 
Finland, Russia remaining problematic and even hostile, this would offer security through tension, not 
through harmony. Extreme tension would then be set to the northern parts of the Baltic Sea, and to the 
Fenno-Russian border in particular. Independent of how the future will look like, the extension of the 
WEU would increase security. Depending on the future of Russia, this security would be voluntary, 
aiming at harmony, or - dictated by threats. On the other hand, too close a relationship between the 
activated WEU and a stabilised Russia could render US-European relations vulnerable, especially if the 
US felt herself consciously excluded. Hence, skilful diplomatic manoeuvres will be needed to reach a 
satisfactory compromise. 
4.2. Scenario 2: Russia Remains Unstable And Becomes Aggressive, Poland And the Baltic 
States Increase Co-operation With NATO, the Establishment of the WEU 
Is Postponed 
In order for Russia to become aggressive, certain domestic and foreign factors have to be present. The 
most important of these factors is Russian public opinion. Yeltsin's staggering popularity is well 
known, but without an increase in the credibility of his counterpart, of the pro-Eurasians, Russia will 
not likely become hostile to the West. Some bad news from Western Europe or the near abroad are 
needed, in order the Eurasianists to be able to ultimately convince the public. The increasing 
co-operation between the Russian near abroad (such as the Baltic states or Poland) and NATO 
would count as bad news, especially after President Yeltsin's explicitly negative attitude towards the 
eastern expansion of NATO. 
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Unfortunately, as the Russian domestic state of affairs is in imbalance and the information delivered on 
the situation minor, both qualitatively and quantitatively, Poland and the Baltic States might not wish to 
wait for the uncertain future in Russia. Hence, commitments towards NATO may be pondered despite 
Russia's critical attitude. This indicates the vicious-circle-like tendency of this scenario. There are no 
certain causalities here, but, rather, either of the two arguments in this scenario can be the cause for the 
other. 
The delay of the improvement of the WEU, in turn, would follow of two, interacting factors. First, the 
expansion of NATO to Poland and the Baltic States would also imply the continuity of NATO presence 
in Europe. Insignificant institutions do not concentrate on extending their sphere of interest. Second, 
partly as a consequence of the former, the old NATO members (Norway), and the old NATO and EU 
members (Germany and Denmark) would presumably not prefer improving the WEU, because of the 
futility of sustaining two institutions the objectives of which practically overlap. 
Consequently, as Russia would grow remote from the rest of Europe, its near abroad growing closer to 
NATO, ingredients for another Cold War would exist, with the difference from 1950-89 that no neutral 
nations (such as formerly Finland and Sweden) nor Russian-related puppets (formerly the Baltic States 
as  a  part  and  Poland,  East  Germany  as  "friends")  would  buffer  the  two  power  blocks.  The  border  
between EU and/or NATO and Russia would stand out clearly, leading to a situation possessing enough 
components for frightening confrontations. 
On the other hand, if a clear-cut borderline of this kind emerged, it would depend on the ultimate foreign 
policy settings of a Eurasian Russia whether the possible confrontations were severe and long-lasting in 
nature, or whether the relations could be kept calm, substantive and consistent. In the case of a border of 
this kind, the probable lack of tough dogmatic contrasts (compare totalitarianism vs. democracy) 
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could even contribute to the establishment of like-minded and consistent mutual diplomacy. However, 
the more Russian hostility will increase, the less probable the establishment of transborder relations of 
this kind would be, at worst remaining as mere wishful thinking. 
In the Baltic context, the increasing remoteness of Russia, the growing importance of NATO in Europe, 
at least indirectly also in the northern parts of Europe, and the freezing of any future development of the 
WEU would bring about several constant problems, let alone contemporary issues for immediate 
resolution. A direct consequence of a Eurasian, hostile Russia would concern the border of Finland, the 
Baltic States and Poland with Russia. In case of a division as a result of this scenario, this border, starting 
from  the  Barents  Sea  in  the  north  and  reaching  all  the  way  down  to  Poland  would  be  seen  as  THE  
strategic border. As a consequence, large masses of armed forces could be concentrated to both sides of 
the border. Furthermore, the actual sovereignty of small countries such as Finland or Sweden, let alone 
the Baltic States, could come into question. Undoubtedly, the common security interests of NATO might 
oblige permanent strategic military implementation of materiel and personnel in these nations, 
independent of domestic willingness. Of course, these perspectives would require also that the formerly 
neutral Nordic nations, Finland and Sweden, were bound to some binding arrangement with NATO. 
This might, however, not explicitly be the case. Recent discussions in the Finnish parliament, for 
example, do not imply a quick NATO membership.15 Reasons for hesitation are several: WEU 
arrangements are still open. Furthermore, Finland seems to endeavour to avoid establishing a strict 
borderline parallel to its territory. Third, it seems that in the current situation, March 13, 1995, no 
immediate reason for joining NATO exists The Finnish military system is capable of protecting the 
Finnish territory 
15 Helsingin Sanomat. February 11, 1995, p. 13 
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satisfactorily, as is Sweden in protecting itself - in the case of a regionally limited and conventionally 
conducted conflict. 
If, however, this scenario materialised, including the possibility of the existence of three different 
security systems, NATO, the Russian and the non-aligned, the Baltic Sea could encounter the most 
active secret military activity ever. The control of the coastal length of the Baltic Sea would speak for 
NATO hegemony The fiercest, most explosive area would certainly be north-eastern Estonia where the 
distance between the first possible NATO base and the huge Russian naval base Kronstadt near St. 
Petersburg could count up to less than 200 kilometres. It could resemble the situation around the Berlin 
Wall in the 50's, although this time with the most modern, totally destructive war equipment, and 
without any logistical obstacles for a full-scale conflict. 
Why, then, would this kind of arrangement be considered in the round tables of the decision-makers, 
particularly if it seemed to merely bring about negative consequences? The traditional fear and 
hesitation of Poland and the Baltic States against Russia seems reasonable, as seems reasonable the 
Eurasian superpower aspirations of the conservative Russians. An ultimate Russian opening-up to the 
West would directly reduce the power of the Russian military, as it would reduce the popularity of such 
politicians that feed the fears of the public about the dominant Western Europe, that would suppress the 
glamorous Slavic heritage and traditions through market capitalism and too much democracy and 
openness. 
In addition to these reasons, pleasure would be felt among certain interest groups in the West, too. The 
fulfilment of this tough border-scenario could also be pursued by populist Western politicians. Public 
popularity, in the West also, may be maintained through feeding fears. Xenophobia, racism and a 
common hostility against minorities are cousins to the fear of a Slavic superpower. Hence, in order to 
win support, certain politicians in Schleswig-Holstein (Germany), Denmark and Sweden, where 
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xenophobic tendencies already exist, could support a strengthening of a NATO-Russia confrontation. 
Why? Because a tension-packed atmosphere with existing threats could increase the support for extreme 
movements. 
The true coming of this scenario is probable. As just indicated, independent reasons do exist. In addition 
to independent causes, dependent factors may also play a role. As happened in the Cold War, a gesture 
of one counterpart could easily lead to, not only a balancing gesture by the other (arms races) but even to 
a cumulative one. Thus, an apparently minor factor could set off an increasing avalanche and thereby 
cause various problems. Today, if, for example, Lithuania joined NATO despite Russian opposition and 
the power relations in Russia remained unclear, this could bring the extreme anti-NATOists, i.e 
Eurasianists, into power in Russia, that, in order to stay in power would claim the US to have provoked 
Lithuania to join NATO. This move, in turn, would cause the US and NATO to become nervous about 
the security in the area. Thereafter, it could possibly be a question of days or weeks when the rest of the 
Baltic States and Poland joined NATO, leading to a contrast based on very negative premises. 
Could it be possible to talk about co-operation around the Baltic Sea if this scenario materialized? 
Certainly, one could no longer consider the Baltic Sea as a well- functioning economic and sociocultural 
entity. Rather, the area would probably fragment, leaving Russia alone at the end of the Sea. Nordic 
co-operation could increase, although within the auspices of the EU. The Baltic States and Poland would 
be eager to be connected to other Western institutions, in order not to remain mere locations for the 
outermost NATO bases. This development, in turn, would extend the EU, too, or at least increase the 
amount of diverse associate agreements with the European Union and other European institutions. 
In  sum,  this  tough  border  scenario  would  feasibly  lead  to  a  less  beneficial  Baltic  Sea  than  the  first  
scenario. This scenario would, at least partly, mean a return to a bygone 
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era, creating stability of some sort. Unfortunately, this kind of stability is not worth aspiring to because it 
is based on mutual threats and the sensitive balance of these threats. This kind of stability would 
supposedly paralyse the general Baltic Sea context, and this not only militarily, but also trade and 
cultural relations would be negatively overshadowed by the security tensions. 
4.3. Scenario 3: The Establishment of the WEU Cannot Be Agreed on, Russia Achieves a 
Stable Democracy, the OSCE Will Determine the Security around the 
Baltic Sea 
 
In contrast to the two former rather far-reaching scenarios, the third one is most based on optimistic 
realism, leaning on hypotheses that are quite likely to come true. In this scenario, it is generally supposed 
that all decision-makers are distinctively rational, wiling to cause as much harmony with as few binding 
commitments as possible, in order to secure optimal trading and other circumstances. 
A delay in the establishment of the WEU may occur, due to internal disputes within the EU. An extended 
establishment of the WEU may fail simply because, for example, of the reluctance of Great Britain to 
make further commitments. Furthermore, some poor Southern European countries such as Greece could 
not afford some additional security measure. Consequently, even if a limited, active WEU was be 
founded, say between Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, it could still not make NATO 
insignificant on the European continent. Hence, if there were two (or more) security arrangements on the 
continent, none of them would achieve such a dominant position as to thoroughly and/or severely affect 
total North European security. 
Moreover, it is possible that Russia achieves a stable democracy. President Yeltsin may not be able to be 
renominated in the coming presidential elections, but independent of who it is, the next president is 
bound to comprehend the dangers of closing doors in any directions On the other hand, too close a 
co-operation with NATO, for example, would rid the president of the support of the extreme left and 
right. Hence, as a 
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consequence of a compromise due to these considerations, added to the fact of Western Europe not 
becoming  a  threat  in  the  form  of  the  WEU,  or  NATO,  Russia  could  then  successfully  continue  the  
co-operation with the West within the auspices of some co-operative, non-binding mechanism such as 
the OSCE. 
As a consequence of a limited or a non-existent WEU, as well as a rationally and farsightedly stable 
Russia, the aggregate security tensions in Europe would inevitably not be critically high. Hence, NATO, 
already without the fulfilment of a scenario of this kind reluctant to accept new members, would without 
increasing tension probably not accept Poland or the Baltic states joining. If not broken, do not fix it. The 
consequences of NATO extending eastbound despite Russian opposition in a relatively stable Europe 
would be in no-one's interests. 
It seems, that in this situation the OSCE would be the best solution. Despite the WEU existing, at least on 
the paper, and NATO hanging around with low profile - only meant to be activated in extreme situations 
- the OSCE would then offer the best prospectives for the future. To the benefits of the OSCE could be 
counted, that, "...its nature is co-operative, objectives pan-European, participation large and 
administration light."16 These characteristics could contribute to the foundation of liberal, well- 
functioning relations in Europe, and especially around the Baltic Sea, the region in Europe most affected 
by the changes in the Russia-Europe-relationship. 
On the other hand, though, as the tensions in Northern Europe would be relatively low, and the OSCE 
would function as the basis for peace-time security matters in Europe17, this would not explicitly mean 
that the situation would become stable. In fact, the CSCE does not ultimately provide stability. The 
commitments are non- 
l6 Tarmer. p. 19 
17 This is a limited idea of the one of the Czech President Vaclav Havel, who suggested in a recent speech a 
European security model that would be completely based on the CSCE. without NATO nor the WEU. 
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binding, leaving room and even temptations for manoeuvres in contradiction to the spirits of this 
institution. Thus, this all-encompassing European scenario, realistic as such, would only function in 
good circumstances. As soon as a severe dispute emerged, the decision-makers would, in 
accordance to the national interests of respective states, either follow or not follow the baskets and 
the principles of the CSCE18. No legally binding clause will force them to follow these. There are 
no threatening sanctions that could prevent the states from considering actions in contradiction to 
the CSCE. 
Transferring this Pan-European prospect to the Baltic level, it seems that this scenario could also, as 
scenario 1, bring activity to the Sea. In contrast to the first scenario, however, a Baltic Sea sheltered 
by the mere principles of the OSCE and the economic regulations of the EU would not provide such 
security that would guarantee stability. As soon as a dispute emerged, say between Sweden and 
Russia, of fishing quotas off the coast of Kaliningrad 19, and Sweden would refer to some basket of 
the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, Russia could act in two ways - if unwilling to settle: either dispute the 
interpretation of the clause of the right of the Swedish fishers to fish a certain quota in front of 
Kaliningrad or act as if the CSCE did not exist, for example through chasing the Swedish fishing 
boats with Navy frigates. No credible sanctions against Russia could be enforced within the 
auspices of the OSCE. 
In addition to certain instability remaining, the process of dealing with security matters would 
become more festive and more remote from the substance itself. Why? Because traditionally in the 
OSCE meetings, the Sunday side of the foreign policy often 
18 The author has consciously referred to the CSCE , albeit the proper, current name would be the OSCE: an 
organisation instead of a former conference. By now. however, the author has not yet come across with any 
information of a change in the legal status of this institution, despite the fact that most institutions that are 
called organizations regularly have rules, the violence of which leads to diverse sanctions that are so critical 
that they prevent any tendency for disobedience. The OSCE seems to remain as non-binding as the CSCE. 
19 A small Russian military enclave on the coast between Lithuania and Poland 
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appears; festive and all-encompassing, although all too general statements would be presented in the 
future meetings. Seldom would the real problems be dealt with. Even if they were, the governments 
could be rather careless of the consequences. This would of course on the long run also affect the 
credibility of the institution. 
Can it be inferred that under these circumstances, the Baltic Sea could start reminding us of Shanghai in 
the 20's: many things are possible, but few certain? Yes, but the author sees the quite recent tendencies 
within the OSCE, especially in the Paris 1990 and Budapest 1994 summits as indications for a search for 
further stability and thereby credibility. First, an absolute consensus is no longer required for a proposal 
to pass. It has been refined to a consensus minus one, hindering thus the chance of the disputing nation 
to veto a proposal aimed at herself.20 Hence, in a Baltic Sea fishing dispute between Sweden and Russia, 
if dealt with on this forum, mere Russian ignorance of the OSCE principles could no longer suffice to 
hinder the process against her. 
Second, the OSCE is endeavouring to increase its weight through increasing the quantity of permanent 
institutions. In addition to the already existing, specifically assigned offices in Warsaw, Prague and 
Vienna, there are aspirations to create a permanent Council in Vienna, as well as to establish a 
Secretariat. Then, a yearly troika, consisting of a representative of the former, current and following 
chairman nations, would function as the general co-ordinators of all actions of the OSCE.21 
What consequences would these alterations within the OSCE bring about in the Baltic Sea? The author 
thinks that if these changes went through, the OSCE would start resembling an all-European WEU, 
though strongly stressing diplomacy rather than miHtary capability. In the Baltic Sea context, this would 
not only mean co-operation such as in the WEU-Russia axis indicated in the first scenario, but operation 
within the 
20 Shea. Janne. Lecture, Boston University Brussels. February 27. 1995                   
21Shea 
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auspices of a common arrangement, the OSCE. A temptation for dispute could decrease, as the 
permanent administrative structure could quickly become aware of the dispute, subordinating it to 
further monitoring. If the action was not in conformity with the principles of the OSCE, a vote 
would then offer the solution. Unless the violator were able to align with another nation, in the 
Swedish-Russian fishing dispute, say, Russia with Poland, the OSCE would, according to the 
consensus minus one rule, set Russia responsible for its behaviour. As the OSCE does not yet 
possess military capability of any sort, stabilising the situation and controlling Russia along its 
coast, if necessary, would be problematic. However, as formerly indicated, Russia has during the 
whole OSCE history supported it. Thus, if the OSCE succeeded in advancing this far to become a 
credible security arrangement, Russia would presumably not oppose any reasonable measures taken 
by the OSCE 
To sum up, the Baltic Sea environment could through the materialisation of this scenario give a 
deep sigh of relief. Despite the lack of heavy support in the form of vast military capacity around the 
Sea, the OSCE could still create a high level of moral norms, the breaking of which could bring the 
violator in a bad light in the international relations scene. This, third scenario approach is based on 
the hypothesis of rational states willing to establish as much harmony with as little binding 
measures as possible. Thus, this is not a Macchiavellian prospective. Survival through defending 
against threats, the other nations, as a basis for foreign policy settings would not bring about a future 
like  this.  Rather,  the  fulfilment  of  this  scenario  could  be  counted  as  a  victory  for  the  complex  
interdependence scholars: mutual interdependence between neighbouring states does exist, and the 
maintenance of these relations, here through the OSCE, is essential for the future successes of these 
nations. 
5. Conclusions 
These three simplified models anticipate the most probable patterns of development in the Baltic 
Sea future. The first, WEU-Russia axis scenario speaks for a coherent 
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Northern Europe, where the symbiosis between Russia and the WEU would prevail and flourish, at the 
expense of US-European relations. The second scenario offers some horror scenes by raising the 
possibility of a return to the past, to the sinister times of the Cold War. Here, however, the counterpart 
for an Eurasian Russia would not merely nor even primarily be the US but NATO, then consisting of the 
majority of the Western European states. A tough border would emerge, partly following the borderline 
of the former Iron Curtain. The third scenario, in turn, may be caused by conscious aspirations, or it will 
materialise through passivity in striving for a change to the current situation. The OSCE as the basis for 
Baltic security could increase activity of all kinds, though keeping the state of instability high in the area. 
Independent of which of the scenarios will come true, certain common denominators remain. First, any 
kind of a future will increase the significance of the Baltic latitudes in world politics. If the policies are 
successful, economic relations will become important, as the relative and absolute purchasing power of 
the quantitatively huge inhabitant masses in the former USSR area increases. Satisfying the markets 
requires huge logistics, and the Baltic Sea seems a natural route for this trade. If, however, tensions 
increase, and the "soft" relations (e.g. trade, cultural, social) become paralysed, then the security and 
military matters make the area important. The Baltic Sea region, a northern part of the European 
heartland, has traditionally been seen as the strategically more critical areas in the world. In the future, a 
confrontation between an integrated, even fortress-like northern Europe and an imperialist Russia would 
be concentrating on the mastery of this sea. 
Another common denominator for all the scenarios is the implicit essence of the future of Russia. The 
improvement there will have a direct effect on the probability of the materialisation of the scenarios. 
However, it has to be well understood that the changes in Russia are not independent variables. The 
Russian regime is thoroughly aware of the altering security map of Western Europe, consequently 
closely focusing 
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on the Baltic Sea, and adjusting the Russian policies accordingly. Achieving information on foreign 
matters has become even more critical than it was during the Cold War. The ones ruling communication 
in Russia have an enormous power. Perhaps, the murder of the chief of the TV broadcaster Ostankino, 
Mr. Vladislav Litjev on March 1, 199422, was an indication of the vast power of the mass media that the 
regime could not stand. Nonetheless, information from abroad has at least as large an importance for the 
decision-making of the Russian regime as data of and from Russian state of affairs is for European 
decision-makers. The causality here has two directions, but the Russian development is still in the 
central spotlight when pondering the future of the Baltic region. 
Some scholars see Russia and its relation to the world pessimistically, "...even now the West silently 
accepts the ex-Soviet space and the former socialist countries as a zone of Russia's special interests and 
influence."23 Presumably, this kind of an approach would speak in favour of the materialisation of the 
third, tough border scenario. Some other scholars are more optimistic. Mr. Brzezinski talks about a plan 
for Europe, where Russia and the US will not only find each other but also the European Union.24 
Despite his optimism, his ideas do not quite match with the ones presented in this essay. Either, 
according to the scenarios here, Russia and Europe will find each other (1), NATO and Europe have to 
find each other (2), or none of the counterparts get married, but go on with the more or less already 
existing arrangements (3). Of the other optimists, Mr. Bildt focuses hopefully on the Russian-Baltic 
States relation as formerly encompassed. 
22 Helsingin Sanomat. March 2, 1994. p. CI 
23 Afanasyev. Yuri N. "Seems Like Old Times? Russia's Place in the World" Current History (Oct. 1994), p. 
306 
 24 Brzezinski. p.42 
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is dependent on the development in Western Europe. Second, the probable Western European security 
arrangements, much results of the Russian situation, determine what kind the future of the Baltic Sea 
will be. 
The outcome of the first scenario could result of Russia becoming Western, certainly because of a turn 
in public opinion (internal cause). The public opinion could be changed by talented Western-oriented 
statesmen such as Mr. Kozyrev or Mr. Kovalev. Also, Western European stability and tranquillity could 
lead to a "westernised" Russia (external cause). As a result of a westernised Russia, the European 
statesmen could consider the WEU as a sufficient and suitable measure for coexisting with Russia. A 
Western Russia and an activated WEU would presumably make NATO inactive or at least less active. 
The Baltic Sea, then would become more stable under the auspices of the favourable WEU-Russia 
relations. Trade and other relations could flourish, although compromises would be favoured, as 
outcomes of mutual negotiations between the EU and Russia. 
In the third scenario, too, Russia could become "westernised", due to similar, partly similar or different 
reasons as in the first scenario (internal and external causes). Here, however, the establishment of an 
activated and extended WEU would not succeed, because, for instance, of a dispute within the European 
Union of the necessity, importance or financing of such a security arrangement. The WEU would be 
postponed. With a Western Russia and without a WEU, Europe would feasibly remain tranquil. Thus, 
NATO would not need to be nervous of its security interests in this situation. It would not need to 
expand to the ex-communist Central European states, and threaten the peaceful status quo. 
Nevertheless, NATO passivity in the model is relative. NATO would be passive in expanding, though 
active in its current scope of interest. The situation being as discussed, no specific alliance nor body 
would become dominant, which would lead to two things; First, there could be room for "softer" bodies 
such as the OSCE that could still be improved to cement and sustain the low 
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level of tension. Second, the Baltic Sea could then function actively, without tension- packed military 
pressure among the surrounding countries. In contrast to the first scenario, nevertheless, the "floor" 
could still remain open: this scenario would lack a stabilising axis. The Baltic Sea would only be 
sheltered by a legally defective, though otherwise functioning organisation, the OSCE. 
The materialisation of the second scenario would also stem from how Russia encounters its domestic 
and foreign environment. Here, however, Russia's conclusions of the internal and external factors would 
make it grow more distant from the rest of Europe, leading to restlessness in the West. Independent of 
whether the WEU was to expand or not, NATO would now negotiate its expansion to Poland and the 
Baltic states, for example, in order to stabilise the threat emerged through the alteration in Russia. The 
importance of the WEU would then sooner or later become secondary, thus leading to a passivity in 
some extent. In this case, the Baltic Sea area would presumably encounter stability a la Cold War, 
though in quite suppressive circumstances. The Baltic Sea would consequently remain of high 
importance, although mainly militarily, and less, if at all, in economics and culture. A tough border 
between the EU and an Eurasian Russian would determine the strategic position of the Baltic region. 
5.2. How will and how should the future of the Baltic Sea look? 
The coming two-three years in Russia and the 1996 EU intergovernmental conference will basically 
determine the guidelines of the Baltic Sea future. At the moment, as Boris Yeltsin seems to be losing 
support to the Eurasianists constantly and consistently, meanwhile Poland is persisting to joining 
NATO soon - despite Russian opposition, as well as Western Europe being highly fragmented, 
especially economically (leading to all but consensus in 1996), the momentum does not seem 
favourable for the first scenario. An extended WEU does not seem very probable, nor 
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does a Western Russia. Thus, a WEU-Russia axis would under these premises remain illusionary. 
On the other hand, if Russia, however, resumed approaching Western Europe, with some other leader 
than the unpopular Mr. Yeltsin, the situation could be different. As the OSCE is eagerly establishing 
relevant institutions, and NATO seems quite reluctant to expand, at least to countries such as Poland (the 
associate agreements seem to suffice), the third scenario could be closest to the reality in the coming 
years. If the WEU, however, would still be extended, the future could look like a combination of the first 
and the third scenarios. 
What about the second, most pessimistic scenario? Several Russian statesmen are clearly on an Eurasian 
course, if they once get the chance. If the coming presidential elections (1996) are won by some 
Eurasianist with sufficiently charisma to persuade, plus an already extensive scope of support especially 
in the legislative and executive bodies, European tension could consequently increase very fast. Any 
hostile and threatening signal from the new Eurasian regime could be interpreted as a countdown for a 
new Cold War in the West. Unfortunately, there are also other reasons, in addition to the presidential 
elections, that can cause even the current or a like-minded regime to grow remote from the rest of 
Europe. Some over-hasty government decision in Poland concerning its future security preferences, for 
example,  or  some too  sharp  a  statement  on  the  Chechnyan war  by  the  EU or  even by the  UN might  
critically change the mindsets of the Russian public and the current regime. The consequences could 
also then resemble the second scenario. 
Normatively, the idealist would in the Baltic context prefer the further improvement of the OSCE: this 
body could approach the Baltic area from a moral point of view (unfortunately, the only approach it is 
currently capable of), stressing the universal nature of humanitarianism. On the other hand, also the 
complex interdependence 
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scholar could favour the OSCE model. This system leaves enough room for rational manoeuvres 
parallel to the national interests of a given Baltic Sea state. Mutual interdependence would follow of an 
active OSCE in the Baltic context, though this development would not underestimate the importance of 
national interests. 
Realists, on the other hand, would favour the tough border scenario, Here, the confrontation between 
the West and the Eurasian Russia would function as a clear premise to build upon. In order the player to 
survive, the threat, the other counterpart has to be opposed, violently if necessary. Here, a tough border 
through the Baltic Sea would function as the borderline. Any actor on the other side of the borderline 
would be considered as an adversary, the posed threat of which would be monitored and also responded 
to if necessary, in order for a nation to survive. 
Independent of the scholarly point of view, two things remain indisputable: First, economic and/or 
military activity around the Baltic Sea will increase, thus adding to the total importance of the Baltic 
Sea within the European context. This importance, then, will compel the surrounding nations, 
independently or as a part of a larger entity, to establish a prompt policy concerning the Baltic Sea. 
These policies together are likely to lead to a fulfilment of one of the three scenarios. In policy-making, 
the level of stabilisation in Russia and the level of consensus within the EU are the most intrinsic 
individual factors determining the tomorrow of the Baltic region. Both favourable tranquillity and 
extreme hostility are probable around the Baltic Sea region. Related to this continuum, another 
continuum determines the level of activity there; Anything between reluctant inertia and open 
reciprocity may prevail among the Baltic area states. 
All in all, as compromising functions as a certain and usual measure in the world politics of today, 
added by the fact that the Baltic Sea will top in the strategic considerations of NATO, WEU, Russia and 
other factors, due to all reasons indicated. 
the most probable future of the area will become a sum of all the different, even contrary objectives of the 
Baltic area states. There will feasibly not be strict tensions, as such tensions would not be parallel to the 
objectives of the majority of the players. On the other hand, paradise-like peace will not come true, either, 
as such state of affairs would not only kill military activity but also healthy competition. Thus, a complex 
interdependence-like situation could occur, where the players, the nations and the larger organisations, 
would be reluctant to see the other players as threats, as this could decrease economic and other beneficial 
mutual activities. Simultaneously, competition would flourish, leading to an active though somewhat 
unstable Baltic environment Scenario 3 could best resemble the future of this kind. The one who wants to 
become everybody's friend, finds himself sooner or later being nobody's friend Still without being 
everybody's friend, one does not have to have any enemies. Skilful compromising will count here, as it has 
count endless times in the history of mankind. 
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